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As the world continues to reel under the unprecedented impacts of the global pan-
demic triggered by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) that has hardly left countries, 
regions and populations with their familiar course of life and living, it also provides 
useful lessons on how public systems can be made more resilient and responsive. 
An important aspect of the recent experience is to assess how health systems—par-
ticularly in low-resourced settings as in most low- and lower-middle-income coun-
tries—have responded to manage the highly dynamic, uncertain challenges posed by 
the pandemic. As in most other key development sectors for large, diverse countries 
such as India, it is also of prime importance for health systems to be able to strike a 
critical balance: adapt to the new paradigm of health care needs following from the 
pandemic through appropriate measures and mechanisms but also remain cognizant 
of other priorities and commitments across the health sector. This calls for doing 
more and also doing better, particularly for appropriate stewardship by the govern-
ment backed by political will. This essay briefly outlines how some of the key learn-
ings in course of responding to the pandemic in India can be incorporated in adap-
tive reform measures for the health system that aims to ‘build back better’.1
1  Evident Fault Lines Across the Health System
Undoubtedly, it is a tough task for any health system to organise, provide, finance 
and coordinate health services in the Indian context, with its immense regional, 
socioeconomic, cultural, political and administrative diversities. Researchers and 
 * Sumit Mazumdar 
 sumit.mazumdar@york.ac.uk
1 Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK
1 Drawing from the post-disaster recovery literature, Building Back Better (BBB) approaches advocate 
reconstructing health and other systems in more responsive and efficient ways. A recent paper discusses 
how BBB approaches need to be integrated with universal health coverage, see https ://www.uhc20 30.org/
filea dmin/uploa ds/uhc20 30/Docum ents/Key_Issue s/Healt h_emerg encie s_and_UHC/UHC20 30_discu 
ssion _paper _on_healt h_emerg encie s_and_UHC_-_May_2020.pdf.
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commentators have observed several challenges around India’s contemporary expe-
rience of pursuing goals of positive health outcomes, adequate standards of qual-
ity of care and ensuring protection against financial risks arising out of ill-health 
and medical care, in a manner that prevents or reduces risks of inequity or health-
induced poverty traps. For a country of its India’s size, population density and gen-
erally poor public health standards, containing the spread and fatality of an unknown 
pandemic as COVID-19 has been always a formidable challenge. Although ques-
tions have been raised regarding the actual scale of the pandemic and consequent 
mortality that might be masked due to low levels of testing and not having com-
prehensive systems of surveillance across the country, it is apparent that immediate 
casualties have been kept under manageable levels by the health system and wider 
supportive actions such as the ‘lockdowns’ and other restrictions on normal eco-
nomic and social activities. However, it has massively stretched the system revealing 
several fault lines in how the health system responds to an emergency, simultane-
ously not affecting routine but critically important actions.
Health systems are generally considered to be an interrelated connection between 
six ‘building-blocks’—service delivery, medical equipment, manpower or health 
workforce, information, financing and stewardship or coordinated leadership. In 
India, as in many other similar contexts, the pandemic has exposed long-standing 
weaknesses across these domains, and only intensifying in face of the emergency. 
The pandemic has revealed the problems a system has to deal with if referral mech-
anisms through appropriate cascade of care involving stages of screening, testing, 
preventive quarantine, hospitalisation and critical care are not synchronised; while 
some regions and metropolitan cities with better wherewithal have been able to have 
some amount of coordinated patient flows, elsewhere this has led to much chaos 
and confusion both among patients and providers. An almost entirely market-
driven and market-led system that controls supplies of almost all critical inputs for 
medical care—drugs and other medical supplies including diagnostic kits, protec-
tive equipment and even patient transportation—and poor regulatory oversight by 
governments has resulted in frequent instances of shortages in supply, skewed dis-
tribution of essential inputs and resultant spikes in their prices. Apart from major 
urban centres, adequate infrastructure of physical and human resource has also been 
found wanting; most facilities of critical care—specialist physicians and paramed-
ics, life support equipment—being almost exclusively concentrated in state capitals 
or metro cities have only resulted in an overstretched health workforce and costly 
delays in treatment. In most states, except for the few private hospitals requisitioned 
by governments for treating patients with COVID-19, there has been little coordina-
tion between the public and the private sector, mostly resulting in several reported 
instances of malpractices by the later such as refusal of treatment or charging exor-
bitant prices. Financing of health care, in classic textbook illustrations of market 
failures, has continued to be dominated by regressive out-of-pocket payments even 
under coverage of private and public health insurance programmes such as the Prad-
han Mantri Jana Aarogya Yojana (PMJAY). In a curious case of adverse selection, 
several private hospitals have been allegedly reported to turn away patients having 
health insurance coverage on different pretexts, but mostly to escape scrutiny of hos-
pitals bills by insurance companies or administrators. Throughout the unfolding of 
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the pandemic and its different stages, there have been several instances of improper 
coordination between different government agencies in reporting the cases and casu-
alties, little-helped by contradictory statements, at times with weak or no scientific 
evidence. Finally, while the pandemic has vindicated how strong, decentralised gov-
ernance can be effective in responding to such emergencies in a timely and coor-
dinated manner, there has been some tendency to centralise several key aspects of 
decision-making and setting priorities at local levels.
2  Lessons Learnt from the Pandemic and the Health System’s 
Response
Although, the pandemic is far from being past its prime amidst all uncertainties 
regarding its prognosis as well as effectiveness and sustainability of the countering 
responses, a few important lessons for the health system are already evident.
Firstly, key inputs to the health system face infrastructural constraints, weak dis-
tribution mechanisms and are highly fragmented across roles and between actors. 
These call for a pressing priority of harmonising how these different inputs are pro-
duced and distributed across the system. In a market-oriented health system, poorly 
defined or inadequate supply-side incentives in the sub-markets for these inputs—
health workforce; medicines, vaccines and medical equipment; physical infrastruc-
ture—lead to skewed supply of these inputs and increase inequity in access to, use 
of and financing health care. Regulatory mechanisms in key input sectors, e.g. medi-
cal and nursing colleges, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, clinical estab-
lishment in general, that remain ambiguously defined, weakly enforced and suffer 
from duplication of functions and lack of transparency are major barriers to ensure 
efficient functioning of the different markets for health care. Among the different 
inputs of similar nature, some has been prioritised over other without considering 
both demand and supply constraints—health workforce being a case in point. Exces-
sive preoccupation with medical colleges and training specialist physicians has led 
to a crippling neglect of training paramedical workers and other medical techni-
cians, notwithstanding their critical importance in emergency response. More than 
70 years of coexistence of the public and private sectors in most of these input mar-
kets have defied both social as well as economic logic with little improvement in 
coordination among roles and functional mechanisms.
Secondly, a highly fragmented system of financing health care leads to both ineffi-
ciency for the system and inequity for the people which only accentuates in emergen-
cies. The flagship national health insurance programme—the Ayushman Bharat—
Pradhan Mantri Jana Aarogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY)—launched in 2018 with a 
‘target’ of covering 100 million families for cashless hospitalisation and currently 
covering about a tenth of that figure, is yet to make its impact. Although, still in its 
early days of implementation, studies2 suggest limited effectiveness of AB-PMJAY 
2 For, e.g. see Garg et  al (2020) available at https ://bmcpu blich ealth .biome dcent ral.com/track /
pdf/10.1186/s1288 9-020-09107 -4.
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to extend financial risk protection, with reports indicating only a handful availing 
its benefits for COVID-19.3 The AB-PMJAY coexists with several other private 
health insurance schemes available to those who can afford to pay the premiums 
and employer-provided schemes such as for government employees or formal sec-
tor workers, but in effect, leaves out vast numbers—including the poor as well as 
millions of ‘middle-class’ families missing the coverage criteria of government 
schemes and unable to afford private insurance—without any effective means to 
insure against adverse financial implications associated with medical care. Although 
recent efforts are being undertaken under AB-PMJAY to standardise payment mech-
anisms across the country, inefficiencies across the system and inequity in financing 
is unlikely to reduce if different groups of people continue to be covered differently, 
and some not at all.
Thirdly, effectiveness of policies and interventions are critically dependent on 
local capacities, coordination and flexibility of decision-making across different 
public agencies and with the private sector on the one hand and between the dif-
ferent levels of public administration within health department, on the other. This 
includes transparent and accountable systems of collecting and disseminating infor-
mation, including key health statistics, and ability for priority-setting at local levels. 
Across the world, responding to the COVID-19 challenges has been the most suc-
cessful in decentralised health systems working synchronously with decentralised 
governance systems at large. In India, the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) 
(and its successor National Health Mission (NHM) had aimed at strengthening 
decentralised functioning of the health system with institutionalised links with local 
political leadership, but seem to have lost its steam after more than a decade in oper-
ation, without ensuring the goals achieved or the lessons learnt. The way forward is 
not of abandoning the rudimentary decentralised system that has been emerging out 
of the NRHM/NHM but strengthening it through sustained investment and support 
in technical, management and functional capacities of both local level health and 
political functionaries.
3  Key Considerations for Progressive and Adaptive Health System 
Reforms
Across the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has provoked public policy to be 
reconsidered in a different paradigm of how public action needs to be dynamically 
adapted to both persisting questions as well as new, unprecedented threats to the 
development processes. In countries such as India, while the crisis has revealed deep 
fault lines within the health system and its linkages with other development sectors, 
it also provides an opportunity to calibrate much-needed people-centric and adaptive 
reforms across the health system. Drawing parallels with post-disaster reconstruc-
tion involving different actions and actors, this calls for ‘building back better’.
3 https ://www.thehi ndu.com/news/natio nal/only-2132-avail ed-or-being -treat ed-for-COVID -19-under -ab-
pmjay /artic le316 35083 .ece
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First, capacity of health systems—in terms of key physical, manpower and finan-
cial resources—that allows responding to emergencies without destabilising other 
concurrent priorities needs to be significantly strengthened. Uninterrupted actions in 
providing essential services for programmes on controlling infectious diseases such 
as tuberculosis, malaria, dengue and HIV/AIDS, antenatal and safe delivery care for 
pregnant mothers, childhood immunization and nutrition, diagnosis and treatment 
for major non-communicable diseases are critical to ensure sustained progress and 
avoid costly unmet need. Appropriate and realistic systems of combining incentives 
and regulatory actions are critical to correct supply-side distortions for most health 
system inputs and skewed concentration in its distribution.
Second, reducing fragmentation within and across the key health system build-
ing blocks—service delivery, manpower, financing, availability of medical equip-
ment and drugs—needs to be a foremost priority. An important consideration here 
is adequate consideration about the ‘missing-middle’ on both supply and demand-
side of the system; strengthening infrastructural capacities in districts in a way that 
most medical care needs can be addressed without the need for travelling out of the 
district and accounting for financial risk protection for the millions outside of any 
formal insurance mechanisms that avoids regressive out-of-pocket financing of med-
ical care. Integrating different schemes that moves towards a single system for all 
Indians regardless of their employment or residential status needs to move beyond 
rhetoric in a systematic, time-bound manner.
Third, investing in a transparent, autonomous and robust health information 
architecture lies at the core of an adaptive health system. Existing systems such 
as the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP) and the Civil Registra-
tion System need radical reforms to improve coverage, reporting and data quality. 
Encouraging new mechanisms such as electronic health records and harmonising 
existing reporting systems across health facilities—including the organised private 
sector—that leverages from a strong Information Technology (IT) backbone and 
data protection regulations remains a key feature of any health reform strategy.
Finally, the pandemic has brought to the fore several new questions and con-
siderations for the health system to respond. This includes issues such as enforc-
ing physical distancing, personal hygiene and other essential protocols in health 
facilities under high patient loads; ensure equitable, transparent systems of access to 
COVID-19 medicines and vaccine(s); specialised needs for other pandemic-induced 
conditions, particularly mental health care needs, including among children and 
adolescents and accounting for intensified vulnerability due to adverse economic 
implications of the pandemic. This requires effective stewardship roles by the gov-
ernment to coordinate actions between the public and the private sectors particularly 
in service delivery and medical supplies, and also between public health and other 
different non-health government departments.
None of these are possible without transformative increases in public invest-
ments. Notwithstanding repeated ‘commitments’ to increase public spending on 
health, India has been unable to garner the required political will to put more money 
into health and develop a supportive ecosystem that ensures it is spent well. Health 
policy is inherently political as it decides who gets what and in what manner. Now 
S162 The Indian Journal of Labour Economics (2020) 63 (Suppl 1):S157–S162
1 3 ISLE
more than ever, it is critical that political will in India assumes an assertive and 
rightful way in steering the health system on the road to responsive reforms.
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